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Abstract
We present a novel theory of the employment relationship. A manager can
invest in attention technology to recognize good worker performance. The
technology may break and is costly to replace. We show that as time passes
without recognition, the worker’s belief about the manager’s technology
worsens and his effort declines. The manager responds by investing, but
this investment is insufficient to stop the decline in effort and eventually
becomes decreasing. The relationship therefore continues deteriorating,
and a return to high performance becomes increasingly unlikely. These
deteriorating dynamics do not arise when recognition is of bad performance
or independent of effort.
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What motivates employees to work hard? A large literature in economics
has been devoted to this question, focusing for the most part on the optimal
design of (explicit or implicit) incentive contracts and on how workers respond
to different forms of compensation.1 In this paper, we provide a novel theory of
the employment relationship: workers’ effort depends not only on compensation,
but also on their beliefs about whether management is paying attention to their
behavior. Only when paying attention can management recognize (good or bad)
worker behavior. Because attention is costly and not directly observable, the
moral hazard problem that arises inside the firm is two-sided: workers must be
incentivized to exert effort; managers must be incentivized to invest in attention.
The idea that workers care about whether they are being “watched” is related
to the widely studied Hawthorne effect, namely the improvement in workers’ per-
formance possibly caused by the “feeling that they are being accorded some at-
tention” (Oxford English Dictionary). Interpretations of the original Hawthorne
experiments and why workers’ behavior may change with their awareness of being
observed vary.2 Our focus is on workers who care about managerial attention be-
cause this attention can produce some form of recognition of their performance.
Workers value recognition for either psychological or financial reasons, or both.
More broadly, our theory is in line with the psychology literature that examines
the determinants of worker productivity. This literature finds that employee job
satisfaction and workers’ perceptions about management matter for both produc-
tivity and profits (Judge et al. 2001; Ostroff 1992; Harter, Schmidt and Hayes
2002). In particular, whether workers believe that they are given “recognition
or praise for doing good work” affects their engagement and performance (Har-
ter et al., 2002, p. 269), and these beliefs can have a significant impact on an
organization’s bottom line (Harter et al., 2010).3
We model managerial attention as a technology that recognizes worker per-
formance. For example, consider a chief operating officer (COO) and a division
1For an excellent survey, see Prendergast (1999).
2The Hawthorne effect originated in a set of experiments conducted in a Western Electric
factory in the 1920s, where workers’ productivity was shown to increase each time a change in
lighting was made. For a recent reassessment, see Levitt and List (2011).
3Saunderson (2004) finds that managers in the public sector know and believe in the im-
portance of employee recognition, yet many fail to have effective recognition programs.
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head or director in a firm. These parties meet regularly to discuss how the di-
rector is handling business, yet the relevant cost of monitoring for the COO is
not attending the meetings but rather learning and thinking about the tradeoffs,
challenges, constraints, and opportunities in the director’s division. The acquired
understanding allows the COO to recognize good ideas and decisions by the di-
rector for some time. Eventually, however, the COO’s attention is needed in
other areas and she may lose grasp of the division’s issues—something the direc-
tor cannot directly observe. We capture these ideas by introducing an attention
technology, an intangible asset that is subject to depreciation and in which a
manager can invest. At any point in time, the manager can recognize a worker’s
performance only if she has a high attention technology in place.4
Can managers be induced to invest in attention technology? How is workers’
effort affected by their perceptions of managerial attention? We provide a model
where these two variables are interlinked and explore their dynamic interaction.
We show that relationship dynamics depend on the monitoring structure. When
recognition is of good performance, dynamics are deteriorating: absent recogni-
tion, worker effort and eventually managerial investment decrease, and a return
to high productivity becomes less likely over time. These dynamics contrast with
those that arise when recognition is of bad performance or independent of effort.
Our model is cast in continuous time. At each moment, a myopic agent
privately chooses effort which generates output for a principal. Output is unob-
servable; instead, the parties observe a verifiable signal—“recognition”—whose
instantaneous arrival rate depends on the principal’s attention technology and
the agent’s effort. If the principal’s technology is high, the arrival rate is propor-
tional to effort; if the technology is low, recognition cannot arrive. Recognition
yields the agent a fixed reward, which may be purely psychological or also en-
tail a monetary bonus. The principal’s attention technology follows a stochastic
process akin to those used for productive assets in the industrial organization lit-
erature (e.g., Besanko and Doraszelski, 2004): a high technology can “break” at
4Another illustrative example of managerial attention is in continuous process improvement,
pioneered by Toyota and imitated by scores of manufacturing firms (Gibbons and Henderson,
2013): workers exert effort to identify performance-enhancing changes to production, and while
these innovations always benefit the firm, workers can be recognized only if an effective system
of management practices is in place to monitor how they engage with the productive process.
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any point and become low, and the principal can invest at some cost to instantly
“fix” it. The agent observes neither the principal’s investment nor her atten-
tion technology, which we thus call the principal’s type. Naturally, the agent’s
incentive to exert effort depends on his belief that the principal’s type is high.
There are several important features of managerial attention that our model
tries to capture. First, workers cannot perfectly assess the quality of the atten-
tion technology. A manager’s ability to identify and document the contributions
made by workers depends on many different and interrelated aspects of manage-
ment, which are themselves difficult to observe.5 Second, the signals produced by
the attention technology are (at least in part) verifiable, typically because they
describe the details of contributions made by workers in a specific context famil-
iar to them. As the COO in the example above, a manager cannot learn those
details unless a high technology is in place; hence, she cannot simply “fake”
recognition at random times. Third, as noted, attention is an asset, although
our analysis imposes no restrictions on how likely the technology is to break at
any point.6 Lastly, unlike with productive assets, the manager does not care
about the attention technology directly; attention is valuable only insofar as it
incentivizes the agent to exert effort.
We focus on continuous equilibria, where the agent’s belief about the prin-
cipal’s type is continuous in the absence of observable events. This belief is a
function of recognition (or lack thereof) and the agent’s belief about the princi-
pal’s investment. Because recognition reveals that the principal’s type is high,
the belief jumps up to one when the agent is recognized. Without investment,
the agent’s belief, and thus his effort, would then decrease continuously as time
passes without recognition, due to Bayesian updating and the possibility that
the attention technology breaks down. But a principal whose technology breaks
could invest to fix it, with certainty or with a high probability, and if the agent
5One reason for this is that management practices display synergies with other practices and
attributes of the firm, as stressed by Milgrom and Roberts (1990, 1995), Ichniowski, Shaw and
Prennushi (1997), Bartling, Fehr and Schmidt (2012), and Brynjolfsson and Milgrom (2013).
6Our analysis is valid even when the depreciation rate is arbitrarily high and the investment
cost arbitrarily low, so that attention approaches an instantaneous monitoring cost. Our view of
attention as an asset is in line with Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen (2012), where management
is a form of technology, as well as with the new approach to growth discussed in Corrado and
Hulten (2010), where expenditures on intangibles are treated as capital.
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expected that to be the case, his belief about the principal’s type would stop de-
creasing. We show however that this does not occur in equilibrium: the principal
invests in attention technology as the agent’s belief declines, but this investment
is insufficient and in fact becomes decreasing when the agent gets pessimistic
enough. Relationship dynamics as a result feature continuous deterioration: ab-
sent recognition, effort and eventually investment go down, and the chances of
obtaining recognition and reverting to high performance decline.
We contrast the dynamics of this model in which the principal can recognize
good performance with those that arise when she can also recognize bad perfor-
mance. Suppose that if a high attention technology is in place, a verifiable bad
signal arrives at a rate that is decreasing in the agent’s effort. The agent incurs a
(psychological or monetary) penalty when a bad signal arrives. We show that if
recognition is primarily of bad performance, or symmetric and thus independent
of effort, the model is essentially static: the agent’s belief and effort, as well as
the principal’s investment, remain constant absent recognition once the principal
starts investing. The relationship therefore does not fall into deterioration.
Our results show that the presence in an organization of the two-sided moral
hazard problem we study has important implications for the dynamics of the
employment relationship. When a manager must invest in attention to recognize
a worker’s behavior, the worker’s belief about attention affects both his incentives
to work and the manager’s incentives to invest, with non-obvious consequences
that depend on how recognition relates to worker effort. Our findings illuminate
a distinction that had not been identified: the literature on firm reputation
(reviewed below) assumes that learning is exogenous, hiding the implications of
different forms of endogenous learning.
Related literature. This paper fits into the literature on firm reputation; see
Cripps (2006) and Bar-Isaac and Tadelis (2008) for surveys. Most closely related
are Board and Meyer-ter-Vehn (2013, 2014) and Dilme´ (2014), where a firm can
invest in product quality and consumers learn about quality through Poisson
signals.7 We apply the theory of reputation to study dynamics inside the firm:
7Board and Meyer-ter-Vehn (2013) compare good news and bad news learning about firm
quality (see also Abreu, Milgrom and Pearce, 1991). We note that learning is always good news
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rather than analyzing how a firm’s reputation for quality affects sales, we ex-
amine how a firm’s reputation for attention affects worker productivity. More
importantly, we depart from the literature by endogenizing the learning process:
whereas in these models of firm reputation consumers observe exogenous signals
of firm quality, in our model the rate at which information arrives depends on
the agent’s action. Marinovic, Skrzypacz and Varas (2015) study firm reputation
when information is endogenously generated by the firm via voluntary certifi-
cation. We instead focus on the dynamics generated by the complementarity
between the principal’s and agent’s actions.8
Our work is also related to an extensive literature on monitoring, which stud-
ies the problem of monitoring or auditing an agent when the monitor cannot
commit to a strategy. Early contributions such as Graetz, Reinganum and Wilde
(1986), Khalil (1997), and Strausz (1997) analyze static settings. More recently,
Dilme´ and Garrett (2014) study a dynamic model where in each period an in-
spector can either wait or inspect a short-lived potential offender, incurring a
cost for changing her action. While our focus is on recognition of good behavior,
monitoring in this literature is of bad behavior, as in the case that we study in
Section 3.
Often motivated by the persistent performance differences across seemingly
similar firms that Gibbons and Henderson (2013) document, a series of recent pa-
pers emphasize path dependence in equilibrium dynamics. For example, Callan-
der and Matouschek (2014) study a search model in which managers learn about
the quality of managerial practices by trial and error, and show that if practices
are complementary, quality is persistent over time. Chassang (2010) finds that
efficient equilibria can be path dependent in a repeated game in which a party
learns to predict her partner’s cost of cooperating over time. Li and Matouschek
(2012) show that bad shocks can have persistent effects in a relational contracts
model in which a principal’s cost of making payments to an agent is privately
observed. Our paper is related in that it also generates persistent relationship
about the principal’s type in our model; we distinguish between good and bad signals about
the (uninformed) agent’s performance.
8Unlike in our model, moral hazard is only one-sided in Board and Meyer-ter-Vehn (2013,
2014), Dilme´ (2014), and Marinovic et al. (2015). This is also the case in Ely and Va¨lima¨ki
(2003) where information depends on both players’ actions.
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dynamics. Unlike these articles, however, we consider a model of reputation, in
which workers’ beliefs about management’s attention play a central role.
Finally, by studying managerial attention, our paper relates to Geanakop-
los and Milgrom (1991) and other work on organizations under cognitive limits,
although we address different issues.9 This literature is concerned with the coor-
dination of agents without conflicting interests, while we consider how an atten-
tion technology interacts with incentive provision.10 The role of attention is also
stressed in empirical work on the time use of managers and firm productivity,
including Bandiera et al. (2011) and Bandiera, Prat and Sadun (2013).
1 The model
Setup. Consider a principal and an agent. Time t ∈ [0,∞) is continuous
and infinite. At each time t, the agent privately chooses effort at ∈ [0, 1] at
instantaneous cost c(at) =
1
2
a2t . The principal receives an output flow equal to
at. This output however is unobservable; instead, the parties observe a verifiable
signal which we call recognition.
Recognition arrives via a (non-homogeneous) Poisson process with parameter
µθtat, where µ > 0 and θt ∈ {L,H} is the state of the principal’s attention
technology at time t, with L = 0 and H = 1. The agent receives a reward b > 0
each time he is recognized. For most of our analysis, we take this reward to be
a purely psychological benefit, so it is exogenously fixed and entails no costs for
the principal. This is in line with our motivation and allows us to focus on the
problem of attention costs rather than the problem that the principal may want
to save on agent compensation. Section 4 considers the case in which the reward
is a monetary bonus chosen and paid by the principal.
The evolution of θt is determined by an exogenous Poisson process and en-
dogenous investment. Specifically, at any time t, a high attention technology
becomes low (“the technology breaks”) with instantaneous probability γ > 0,
9See Garicano and Prat (2013) for a survey of this literature.
10Dur (2009) and Dur, Non and Roelfsema (2010) study workers who reciprocate managerial
attention with effort. Gil and Mondria (2011) consider a multitasking setting where allocating
more attention to a task increases the precision of its performance measures.
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and the principal can invest at any point by paying a lump sum cost F > 0 to
instantly transform a low technology into a high one (“fix the technology”).11
The simple form of depreciation is assumed for tractability. The assumption
that the principal can instantly fix the technology is not only convenient but also
appealing: it removes additional frictions and thus yields a simple benchmark
for our model, as we show below.
The agent observes neither the principal’s investment nor her attention tech-
nology, which we thus call the principal’s type.
A “heuristic timing” of the game within each instant is as follows: first, the
principal decides whether to fix the technology (if low) and the agent chooses ef-
fort; next, recognition arrives or not and the agent receives a reward accordingly;
finally, the attention technology (if high) breaks or not.
A remark on terminology: the principal’s attention technology is a “monitor-
ing technology.” However, “monitoring” is typically used in the literature (see our
review in the Introduction) as referring to monitoring that is of bad rather than
good performance, and a flow rather than an asset. We use the term “attention”
to make clear the distinction with our assumptions.
Strategies and payoffs. Let hAt− be the agent’s private history up to (but
not including) time t, consisting of the history of effort choices and recognition
(public signal) arrival times up to t. A (pure) strategy for the agent specifies, for
each hAt−, a choice of effort at t, at. This strategy, a = {at}t≥0, is progressively
measurable with respect to the filtration induced by the histories hAt−. The
principal’s private history is denoted hPt− and consists of the history of type
realizations (equivalently, θ0, investment decisions, and depreciation shocks) and
recognition arrival times up to t. A strategy for the principal specifies, for each
time t at which the technology breaks (i.e. the type switches from high to low)
11We model attention as a capital asset in dynamic industrial organization models. In Be-
sanko and Doraszelski (2004), for example, an asset is subject to two forces in each period:
endogenous investment raises its value and exogenous depreciation lowers it. We consider
a continuous-time two-value version of this process. In the reputation models of Board and
Meyer-ter-Vehn (2013, 2014) and Dilme´ (2014), firm quality also takes one of two values. Board
and Meyer-ter-Vehn assume that the firm can increase quality only if a shock occurs when it
invests; in our setting, the principal’s instantaneous probability of investment corresponds to
the transition probability from a low to a high technology. Dilme´ assumes that the firm fully
controls quality, so there are no exogenous shocks to quality in his model.
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and history up to time t, hPt−, a cumulative distribution Q(z, t) over the time
z ≥ t to invest in fixing it. This strategy, Q = {Q(z, t)}z≥t,t≥0, is progressively
measurable with respect to the filtration induced by the histories hPt−. Note that
the investment plan chosen by the principal at any time t at which the technology
breaks will be sequentially optimal. In particular, since nothing happens until
the principal invests—as the type remains low in the absence of investment and
no recognition can occur while the type is low—the principal will want to follow
the prescribed distribution.
The agent’s belief that the principal’s type is high at (the beginning of) time
t is xt ≡ EQ˜,x0 [θt|hAt−] ∈ [0, 1], where Q˜ = {Q˜(z, t)}z≥t,t≥0 is the agent’s belief
about the principal’s investment strategy and x0 ∈ (0, 1] is the exogenous and
commonly known prior belief.12 That is, the agent’s belief about the principal’s
type depends on the history of effort and recognition arrival times through the
conjectured investment strategy Q˜ and prior x0. Since xt is then a function of
hAt− only and we assume the agent’s effort strategy to be progressively measur-
able, x = {xt}t≥0 is also progressively measurable.
Both parties are risk neutral. For tractability and to focus on the dynamic
incentives of the principal, we assume that the agent is myopic; Section 4 consid-
ers the case of a forward-looking agent. Given belief xt and effort at, the agent’s
(instantaneous) expected payoff at time t ≥ 0 is
Ut = µxtatb− 1
2
a2t .
The first-order condition for the optimal choice of effort, given belief xt, is
at = µxtb. (1)
To rule out corner solutions, we assume:
Assumption 1. µb ≤ 1.
Hence, condition (1) always pins down the agent’s optimal level of effort.
12Q˜ could be a non-trivial probability distribution over Q. In this case, Q˜ is a Borel probabil-
ity measure over the set of cumulative distribution functions Q(z, t). As we need to define Borel
sets over this set, we endow it with the weak∗-topology. See Aliprantis and Border (2007).
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The principal discounts future payoffs at rate r > 0. Denote by (Tj)
∞
j=1 the
(stochastic) instants at which the principal’s attention technology breaks. Let
P (z, Tj, Tj+1) ≡ Q(z,Tj)Q(Tj+1,Tj) be the cumulative distribution over the time to invest
in fixing the technology that the principal chooses at time Tj given that the
technology breaks again at Tj+1, which implies that the principal must have
invested in between these times (only a high technology can break). Then given
a = {at}t≥0 and Q = {Q(z, t)}z≥t,t≥0, the principal’s expected payoff at time 0 is
pi0 = EQ,θ0
[∫ ∞
0
e−rtatdt−
∞∑
j=1
∫ Tj+1
Tj
e−rzFdP (z, Tj, Tj+1)
]
.
Equilibrium. Each time there is recognition, the agent learns that the prin-
cipal’s type is high, so his belief is reset to xt = 1. The agent receives no
information about the principal’s type until recognition again occurs. We there-
fore restrict attention to equilibria in strategies that depend only on what has
happened since the last recognition (see, e.g., Board and Meyer-ter-Vehn, 2014).
With a slight abuse of notation, we drop the time index in our analysis and write
all variables as a function of the time that has passed since recognition, denoted
by s.
Analogous to the definitions above, a strategy for the agent is a = {as}s≥0
(progressively measurable with respect to the filtration induced by the histo-
ries hAs−) and a strategy for the principal is Q = {Q(z, s)}z≥s,s≥0 (progressively
measurable with respect to the filtration induced by the histories hPs−). An
equilibrium is a quadruple (a,Q, Q˜, x) such that: (i) given x, a maximizes the
agent’s (instantaneous) expected payoff; (ii) given a, Q maximizes the principal’s
expected payoff; (iii) Q˜ is correct; and (iv) given a and Q˜, x is updated by Bayes’
rule. A continuous equilibrium is an equilibrium in which xs is continuous for all
s ≥ 0.13 That is, in a continuous equilibrium, the agent’s belief as a function of
time t is continuous in the absence of publicly observable events. In any contin-
uous equilibrium, Q(z, s) must be continuous, and we will further assume in this
case that it is absolutely continuous, so it admits a density function. We then
13Board and Meyer-ter-Vehn (2013) use a similar notion in their model of reputation.
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take the principal’s strategy in a continuous equilibrium to simply specify an
instantaneous probability of investment as a function of the time since recogni-
tion and the principal’s current type (note that past type realizations are payoff
irrelevant for the principal given her current type). More precisely, in a contin-
uous equilibrium, the principal’s strategy specifies an instantaneous investment
probability qs for each time s ≥ 0 conditional on a low type at s, θs = L (and
zero investment if θs = H). The agent’s belief about qs is denoted q˜s.
Observable attention benchmark. Before turning to the equilibrium analy-
sis, consider a benchmark in which the principal’s attention technology is observ-
able by the agent. It follows from (1) that the agent’s effort at any time t ≥ 0
is at = µb if θt = H and at = 0 if θt = L. Take now any time t at which the
technology breaks. For any δ > 0, the principal prefers to fix the technology at
time t and then again at t+ δ if it breaks by then, rather than waiting and fixing
the technology at time t+ δ, if and only if∫ δ
0
e−(γ+r)τµbdτ − F − (1− e−γδ) e−rδF ≥ −e−rδF.
Integrating and simplifying this expression yields that the principal fixes her at-
tention technology whenever it breaks if and only if µb ≥ (γ+r)F , that is, if and
only if the resulting increase in output is larger than the instantaneous rental
cost of capital, given by the risk of breakdown plus the interest rate. It is imme-
diate that this condition is also necessary for the principal to invest in attention
technology when the technology is unobservable by the agent. Throughout our
analysis, we thus assume that parameters are such that this condition is satisfied:
Assumption 2. µb ≥ (γ + r)F .
2 Relationship dynamics
Unlike in the observable attention benchmark described above, in equilibrium the
principal cannot fix her attention technology each time it breaks when attention is
unobservable: if the principal always invests, the agent’s belief that the principal’s
10
type is high is xs = 1 at all s ≥ 0, but then the agent always exerts effort as = µb
and the principal has no incentives to invest at cost F .
We construct a continuous equilibrium in which the principal does not invest
if the time that has passed since recognition is s < s, for an endogenous threshold
time s ∈ (0,∞), and she mixes between investing and not investing if s ≥ s. We
show that any continuous equilibrium with positive investment must take this
form, and one such equilibrium exists if the cost of investment F is small enough.
Consider first the agent’s belief about the principal’s type, xs. At s = 0 this
belief is x0 = 1, since recognition fully reveals that the type is high. Then, given
no recognition, the change in xs is given by three sources: (i) the possibility
that a high attention technology breaks, with instantaneous probability γ; (ii)
learning about the technology in the absence of recognition, according to Bayes’
rule; and (iii) the agent’s belief about the principal’s investment, which must be
correct in equilibrium (i.e. q˜s = qs). If qs is continuous on a given open interval,
then locally in that interval the evolution of xs is governed by
x˙s = −γxs − xs(1− xs)µas + (1− xs)qs. (2)
This law of motion is similar to that in Board and Meyer-ter-Vehn (2013), with
an important difference: our Bayesian learning term, xs(1− xs)µas, depends on
the agent’s action as, while it is only a function of xs in their paper (see their
equation 2.2). In our setting the learning process is endogenous and depends
on the agent’s behavior; as shown in Section 3, this difference has important
implications for the dynamics of the relationship.
In the equilibrium we are constructing, the principal does not invest before the
threshold time s is reached. Hence, for s < s, the law of motion for xs becomes
x˙s = −γxs − x2s(1− xs)µ2b, (3)
where we have substituted as = µxsb. Solving this differential equation with
initial condition x0 = 1 uniquely pins down the agent’s belief and effort at s < s.
Naturally, xs and as are strictly decreasing over this time period: since the
principal is not investing, the agent becomes more pessimistic that her type is
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high as time passes without recognition, both because of Bayesian updating and
because the probability that the principal’s technology has broken goes up.
Consider next the principal’s incentives to invest. Let piHs be the principal’s
expected payoff at s when her type is θs = H and pi
L
s when her type is θs = L.
The principal is willing to invest at s only if piLs ≤ piHs −F . Since, by construction,
at any point in this equilibrium the principal either does not want to invest or
is indifferent between investing and not, piLs ≥ piHs − F for all s ≥ 0 and we can
write the expected payoffs for the two principal types as
piLs =
∫ ∞
s
e−r(τ−s)aτdτ , (4)
piHs =
∫ ∞
s
e−(γ+r)(τ−s)−
∫ τ
s µazdz
(
aτ + γpi
L
τ + µaτpi
H
0
)
dτ . (5)
The low type’s expected payoff at any point is simply the output given by
the agent’s effort. To interpret the high type’s expected payoff, note that the
instantaneous probability that her technology breaks at any time is γ, and the
instantaneous probability that recognition occurs given a high type at time z is
µaz. Thus, between times s and τ , the probability that no breakdown occurs is
e−γ(τ−s), and the probability that no recognition occurs, given no breakdown, is
e−
∫ τ
s µazdz. So long as neither breakdown nor recognition occurs, the high type
receives the output flow. If the technology breaks at time τ , her continuation
payoff is piLτ , whereas if recognition occurs, her continuation payoff is pi
H
0 .
To convey the economic intuitions more clearly, let Ψs ≡ piH0 − piHs denote
the principal’s value of recognition at time s and Λs ≡ piHs − piLs her value of
investing at s. At each time s ≥ s in the equilibrium, the principal follows a
mixed strategy, so she must be indifferent between investing and not investing:
Λs = F. (6)
It follows that Λ˙s = 0 for all s ≥ s, which combined with (4)-(6) yields
Ψsµas = (γ + r)F. (7)
The left-hand side is the principal’s instantaneous benefit of investment at time
12
s, given by the value of recognition times the instantaneous probability of recog-
nition conditional on a high type. Equation (7) says that, for the principal to be
indifferent at each time s ≥ s, her instantaneous benefit of investment must be
equal to the instantaneous rental cost of capital at all such times. The instanta-
neous benefit of investment must therefore be constant for s ≥ s, which implies
that the agent’s effort must be decreasing (increasing) at any such time at which
the value of recognition is increasing (decreasing). Our main result shows that
the value of recognition is in fact strictly increasing, and hence effort strictly
decreasing, at all times s ≥ s in the equilibrium; moreover, effort becomes low
enough that the principal’s investment must become strictly decreasing as well.
Proposition 1. Fix any set of parameters (γ, µ, b, r). There exist F > 0 and
F ∈ (0, F ) such that a continuous equilibrium with positive investment exists if
and only if the cost of investment is F ≤ F , and all continuous equilibria have
positive investment if F ≤ F . In any continuous equilibrium with positive invest-
ment, the principal does not invest if the time that has passed since recognition
is s < s, for a threshold time s ∈ (0,∞); at s ≥ s, the principal invests with a
continuous instantaneous probability qs ∈ (0,∞) which is strictly decreasing for
s > s large enough. The agent’s belief xs and effort as, and thus the uncondi-
tional instantaneous probability of recognition µxsas, are continuous and strictly
decreasing for all s ≥ 0. If r ≤ γ, the value of s, and thus the continuous
equilibrium with positive investment, are unique.
Proof. See Appendix A. Q.E.D.
Figure 1 illustrates the equilibrium. When the agent’s belief is relatively high,
the principal’s benefit from being revealed to be a high-attention type is small.
Following recognition, there is thus a period of time during which the principal
does not invest. As time passes and the agent’s belief and effort go down, the
principal’s value of recognition increases, until at time s the principal finds it
optimal to start investing. The principal’s investment however is insufficient to
stop the decline in effort, and at some point it also begins to decline. Hence,
as time goes by without recognition, both the agent’s effort and the principal’s
investment decrease, and so does the probability of obtaining recognition.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium dynamics. Parameters are γ = 1, F = 0.09, µ = 1,
b = 0.7, and r = 0.01. Recs is the unconditional instantaneous probability of
recognition, given by µxsas. The vertical line indicates the threshold time s.
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As mentioned, the intuition for why the agent’s effort decreases prior to s
is immediate. But why must effort continue going down at s ≥ s while the
principal invests? Recall from (7) that the principal’s indifference condition yields
Ψs =
(γ+r)F
µas
. Moreover, by definition, Ψ˙s = Λ˙s − p˙iLs , and thus for s ≥ s,
Ψ˙s = −p˙iLs = as− rpiLs ; that is, the value of recognition increases (decreases) at s
if current effort is above (below) the long-run future average. We can then show
that Ψ˙s and a˙s cannot change signs at a time s > s. For a stark intuition, suppose
effort were decreasing up to s′ and increasing from then on, for s′ > s. Then
both the value of recognition Ψs and the conditional probability of recognition
µas would be lower at s
′ than right before this time. But since the principal
is indifferent at s′, she would have strict incentives to invest right before, a
contradiction. Hence, effort as must be a monotonic function over s ≥ s, and in
fact an analogous argument shows that it cannot be a strictly increasing function.
It follows that the agent’s effort is either constant or strictly decreasing for
all s ≥ s. We prove that it must indeed be strictly decreasing in equilibrium
by showing that not only the agent’s belief is continuous but also the change in
the belief must be continuous. Specifically, the equilibrium must satisfy smooth
pasting: x˙s is continuous at s. Since x˙s < 0 for s < s, this implies that x˙s, and
thus a˙s, are strictly negative in a right neighborhood of s, and therefore for all
s ≥ s. The logic for smooth pasting is similar to that above, namely it is needed
to provide the principal the right amount of incentives to invest at each point.
Suppose for the purpose of contradiction that x˙s and thus a˙s were to jump at
s. Clearly, they can only jump up (recall qs = 0 at s < s), and since Ψ˙s is
continuous,14 the change in the principal’s instantaneous benefit of investment,
µ
(
Ψ˙sas+Ψsa˙s
)
, would then also jump up at s. However, since µ
(
Ψ˙sas+Ψsa˙s
)
= 0
from s on by condition (7), this would imply µ
(
Ψ˙sas + Ψsa˙s
)
< 0 for s < s close
enough to s, and therefore (using (7) again) Ψsµas > (γ + r)F for such times.
The contradiction is then immediate: the principal would have strict incentives
to invest in attention technology before reaching the threshold time s.15
14Note that Ψ˙s = Λ˙s−p˙iLs , where p˙iLs = −as+rpiLs and Λ˙s = (γ+r)Λs−µasΨs are continuous.
15More formally: observe that, as noted in fn. 14, Λ˙s = (γ+r)Λs−µasΨs, and the equilibrium
requires Λs < F for s < s and Λs = F for s ≥ s. But then Ψsµas > (γ + r)F for s < s close
to s implies Λ˙s < 0 at such times, a contradiction.
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A principal who delays investment is therefore punished with continuous dete-
rioration of the relationship. The agent becomes more pessimistic and his effort
declines over time, so that even if the principal then decides to invest, it is harder
to obtain recognition and return to high performance. In fact, we can show that
in the limit for an infinitely patient principal, the equilibrium gives rise to a
trap as the moral hazard problem becomes more severe. Consider the limit as
the discount rate r goes to zero and let the principal’s cost of investment be
F < F so that the equilibrium of Proposition 1 exists. Appendix B shows that
as F approaches F , lims→∞ xs and lims→∞ as vanish: the probability of obtain-
ing recognition and reverting to high performance goes to zero as time passes
without recognition.16
Proposition 1 also shows that the equilibrium investment path is hump-shaped.
The logic is elaborate because the principal uses a mixed strategy, but to see the
main idea, take the aforementioned case in which the agent’s belief and effort
go to zero absent recognition. At one extreme, it is clear that the principal will
not invest when the agent’s belief is close to one, as the value of recognition
is then close to zero. At the other extreme, it is also clear that as the agent’s
belief approaches zero, the principal’s investment must go to zero: as shown
by (2), if xs = 0, x˙s is determined by (the agent’s correct belief over) qs, so
xs, and hence as, would increase in equilibrium if qs > 0. More generally, we
show that punishing the principal for not investing requires effort to become low
enough over time that investment must eventually become decreasing for effort
to continue declining.
Finally, about uniqueness: two arguments are used to show that any contin-
uous equilibrium with positive investment must be as characterized in Proposi-
tion 1. First, we show that any such equilibrium where, at each time s ≥ 0,
the principal either is indifferent or does not have incentives to invest, must take
this form. Second, we show that a continuous equilibrium where the principal
has strict incentives to invest over some time interval does not exist. Intuitively,
in any such equilibrium, the principal should strictly want to invest at s = 0;
16Put differently, for any δ > 0 and ε > 0, there exist r > 0, F < F , and a time since
recognition s > 0 such that the probability of obtaining recognition in (s, s+ δ) is strictly less
than ε.
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otherwise, if she has strict incentives to invest at s′ > 0 but not before, xs must
either increase continuously toward one as s approaches s′ or jump to one at s′,
neither of which can occur. However, since Ψ0 = 0, the principal will not want
to invest at s = 0. As for the result that any continuous equilibrium must be as
described in Proposition 1 if F is small enough, this follows from the fact that a
no-investment equilibrium does not exist in that case: without investment, effort
decreases as time passes without recognition, but then for F sufficiently small
the principal eventually has strict incentives to invest to obtain recognition.17
3 Recognition of good and bad performance
We have considered a principal who can recognize good performance by the agent.
What happens if she can also recognize bad performance? Recognition is more
likely to be of good performance in jobs based on innovation, where the verifiable
event is the presence of something positive like a breakthrough. Recognition of
bad performance, on the other hand, may arise in jobs where employees perform
well-defined tasks, like maintenance or quality control, and the verifiable event
is the presence of something negative like a fault.
Take the model of Section 1 but assume now that there are two types of
(verifiable) signals: good-performance signals and bad-performance signals. A
good signal arrives via a Poisson process with parameter µθtat, whereas a bad
signal arrives via a Poisson process with parameter νθt(1 − at), where µ, ν ≥ 0.
The agent receives a reward b > 0 when a good signal arrives and incurs a penalty
b < 0 when a bad signal arrives. Analogous to (1) and Assumption 1, for any
t ≥ 0, the agent’s effort is at = xt(µb− νb), where we assume µb− νb ≤ 1.
The benchmark case where the principal’s attention technology is observable
is qualitatively the same as that in Section 1. In this setting with good- and bad-
performance signals, the principal invests in attention if and only if µb − νb ≥
(γ + r)F ; analogous to Assumption 2, we assume that this condition holds.
Now suppose that the principal’s attention technology is unobservable by the
17Note that the agent’s belief xs and effort as are strictly positive for all finite s. An
equilibrium with no effort and no investment cannot be sustained unless the agent’s prior
belief that the principal’s type is high is assumed to be zero.
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agent. Each time recognition—of either good or bad performance—occurs, the
agent learns that the principal’s type is high and thus his belief is reset to one.
As in Section 2, we consider equilibria in strategies that depend only on what
has happened since recognition last occurred. Let s be the time since recogni-
tion. We characterize a continuous equilibrium (i.e., an equilibrium in which the
agent’s belief xs is continuous) in which the principal does not invest in attention
technology if s < ŝ, for an endogenous threshold time ŝ ∈ (0,∞), and she mixes
between investing and not if s ≥ ŝ.
Consider the law of motion for the agent’s belief xs. At s = 0, the belief
is x0 = 1. Then, given no recognition, the evolution of the belief on any open
interval over which qs is continuous is governed by
x˙s = −γxs − xs(1− xs)[µas + ν(1− as)] + (1− xs)qs. (8)
Before time ŝ is reached, the principal does not invest. Substituting as = xs(µb−
νb) and qs = 0 into (8), the law of motion for s < ŝ is
x˙s = −γxs − xs(1− xs)[(µ− ν)xs(µb− νb) + ν]. (9)
Solving this differential equation with initial condition x0 = 1 pins down the
agent’s belief and effort at s < ŝ.
Consider now s ≥ ŝ. The principal must be indifferent between investing and
not investing at these times. Analogous to (7), indifference yields
Ψs[µas + ν(1− as)] = (γ + r)F. (10)
Condition (10) shows that the sign of µ− ν is key in determining the qualitative
properties of the solution. If µ − ν > 0, the solution is qualitatively the same
as that in Section 2. Suppose instead that µ − ν ≤ 0. Then (10) shows that
the agent’s effort as and the principal’s value of recognition Ψs must move in
the same direction for the principal’s instantaneous benefit of investment to be
constant for s ≥ ŝ. Now since Ψ˙s = as − rpiLs , it follows that effort must be
strictly increasing (decreasing) at any time s ≥ ŝ at which it is strictly above
(below) its long-run future average, which implies that effort cannot be different
18
from the long-run average at any such time. Therefore, when µ− ν ≤ 0, as and
Ψs must be constant for s ≥ ŝ.
Proposition 2. Consider a setting with recognition of good and bad performance.
If recognition is primarily of good performance (i.e. µ > ν), the continuous equi-
libria are as characterized in Proposition 1. Suppose instead that recognition is
primarily of bad performance or symmetric (i.e. µ ≤ ν). Then in any continu-
ous equilibrium with positive investment, the principal does not invest if the time
that has passed since recognition is s < ŝ, for a threshold time ŝ ∈ (0,∞), and
she invests with a constant instantaneous probability q̂ ∈ (0,∞) for s ≥ ŝ. The
agent’s belief xs and effort as are decreasing for s < ŝ and constant for s ≥ ŝ.
The unconditional instantaneous probability of recognition, xs[µas + ν(1 − as)],
is constant for s ≥ ŝ.
Proof. See Appendix C. Q.E.D.
Figure 2 illustrates the equilibria. When recognition is primarily of bad per-
formance or symmetric, the equilibrium is essentially static: the principal’s in-
vestment is zero initially and constant after it jumps up at the threshold time
ŝ; the agent’s belief and effort and the unconditional instantaneous probability
of recognition are also constant for s ≥ ŝ.18 Hence, unlike when recognition is
primarily of good performance, the relationship does not continue deteriorating
over time.
The intuition for these results stems from the principal’s incentives to invest
in attention technology. The principal’s instantaneous benefit of investment is
the product of the instantaneous probability of recognition conditional on a high
attention technology and the value of recognition. When recognition is of bad
performance or symmetric, a decline in the agent’s effort has a direct effect of
(weakly) increasing the principal’s incentive to invest because it (weakly) in-
creases the probability of obtaining recognition. However, when recognition is of
good performance, a decline in effort has a negative direct effect, as the probabil-
ity of recognition goes down. Consequently, incentivizing the principal to invest
18Appendix C shows that a continuous equilibrium with positive investment exists if and
only if the cost of investment F is small enough. Moreover, the value of ŝ is unique.
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Figure 2: Equilibrium dynamics when recognition is of good performance (solid
lines) and when recognition is of bad performance (dashed lines). We set µ = 1
and ν = 0 in the former case and µ = 0 and ν = 1 in the latter; all other
parameters are the same as in Figure 1. Recs is the unconditional instantaneous
probability of recognition, given by xs[µas+ν(1−as)]. The vertical lines indicate
the threshold times s and ŝ.
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in this case requires that her value of recognition increase; that is, she must be
threatened with continuously decreasing effort over time.
Our results have implications for the study of firm reputation. Note that when
recognition is symmetric (µ = ν), the instantaneous probability with which a
signal arrives is independent of the agent’s effort. This case corresponds to
the one typically studied in models of firm reputation. For example, Board
and Meyer-ter-Vehn (2013) consider a setting in which consumers observe public
signals of the quality of a firm’s product, but the arrival rate of these signals
is independent of consumers’ actions (which are not explicitly modeled). The
reputational dynamics they obtain are as we characterize for the case of µ ≤ ν.19
In reality, however, consumers are more likely to learn about the quality of
a product when the volume of sales is larger, both because more consumers
experience with the product directly and because more consumers are likely to
learn from the experience of others.20 To map our model into this problem,
take θs to be firm quality, xs consumers’ expectation of firm quality, and as
the volume of sales at time s. The case studied in Board and Meyer-ter-Vehn
(2013) is one in which the firm sells a single unit at each time and consumers
compete in a Bertrand fashion, so the product price equals xs and as is fixed.
But another possibility is for the price to be fixed and quantity to adjust, so that
the volume of sales as is an increasing function of perceived quality xs, analogous
to our model in Section 2. Here sales will change with perceived quality and in
turn affect the rate at which information about quality is generated. As shown
in Proposition 1 and Proposition 2, this effect leads to qualitatively different
reputational dynamics.
4 Discussion
Forward-looking agent. For tractability and to focus on the principal’s dy-
namic incentives, we assumed throughout that the agent is myopic. The presence
of a forward-looking player and a myopic one is in line with the literature on firm
19Specifically, see the case of a convergent cutoff in their perfect good news setting.
20Rob and Fishman (2005) study a model in which information about firm quality spreads
in the market through word of mouth.
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reputation. In practice, however, workers are not fully myopic, and they can ben-
efit from experimenting: unlike a myopic agent, they value having information
in the future about whether managerial attention is high or low.
While we cannot solve the model with a forward-looking agent analytically, we
can numerically construct an equilibrium analogous to the one in Proposition 1
and show that it yields qualitatively the same relationship dynamics as with a
myopic agent. Consider the setting of Section 1, in which recognition is of good
performance, but assume now that the agent is forward-looking and discounts
the future at the same rate r > 0 as the principal. The agent’s expected payoff
following recognition is
U0 =
∫ ∞
0
e−
∫ s
0 (r+µxτaτ )dτ
[
µxsas(b+ U0)− 1
2
a2s
]
ds.
For intuition, note that the instantaneous probability assigned by the agent to
recognition occurring at a time τ is µxτaτ , and hence his belief that recognition
will not occur by time s is e−
∫ s
0 µxτaτdτ . When recognition occurs, the agent
receives the reward b plus an expected continuation payoff U0.
The agent chooses an effort plan {as}s≥0 to maximize U0 subject to the law
of motion for xs given in equation (2), where qs is taken as given. Appendix D
sets up the Hamiltonian for the agent’s problem and derives the first-order con-
ditions.21 We then solve for a continuous equilibrium that parallels the one we
constructed in Section 2: for a threshold time s ∈ (0,∞), the principal does
not invest if the time that has passed since recognition is s < s and she mixes
between investing and not investing if s ≥ s.
Figure 3 provides a graphical illustration. The figure shows that the equilib-
rium dynamics are qualitatively the same with a forward-looking agent and with
a myopic agent. As expected, though, there are quantitative differences. We
find that in the forward-looking agent case, the agent’s effort and the principal’s
investment are higher. The intuition is related to the value of experimentation
mentioned above: because a forward-looking agent benefits from knowing in the
21Note that given the principal’s investment strategy, the agent chooses a sequence of effort
to maximize his expected utility taking into account how his belief evolves as a function of his
effort choices and the principal’s investment (and recognition). This computation ensures that
no deviation (including double deviations) is profitable for the agent.
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Figure 3: Equilibrium dynamics with a myopic agent (solid lines) and with
a forward-looking agent (dashed lines). Parameters are the same as in Fig-
ure 1. Recs is the unconditional instantaneous probability of recognition, given
by µxsas. The vertical lines indicate the threshold times s in each equilibrium.
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future whether the principal’s type is high or low, for any given belief about
the principal’s current type, his incentive to exert effort is higher than that of
a myopic agent. Given the complementarity between effort and investment, the
principal in turn invests more when the agent is forward-looking.
Recognition reward. In our model, the recognition reward b entails no costs
to the principal and has a fixed exogenous value. This formulation is appealing if
the reward is taken to be purely psychological. Suppose we instead take b to be
(partly) a monetary bonus. Then our model has assumed that this bonus is paid
not by the principal but by some external, unmodeled party, and that its value is
set exogenously. The first assumption is convenient to focus on the moral hazard
problem due to the principal’s cost of investment and abstract from another
source of moral hazard: if the principal incurs the cost of the bonus directly, she
may want to decrease her investment in attention technology to save on this cost.
The second assumption is a natural consequence of the first.
Our qualitative results are unchanged if we remove the first assumption while
keeping the second one. That is, suppose b is an exogenously set bonus but
the principal bears the cost of bonus payments. We can incorporate this by
simply re-defining the principal’s payoff following recognition as piH0 ≡ piH0 −b; our
analysis can then be performed without change. The dynamics of the relationship
are qualitatively the same as in our main model; quantitatively, of course, the
principal’s incentives to invest will now be lower.
Allowing for an endogenous (and time-varying) bonus, on the other hand, can
lead to different dynamics, as the principal may increase the bonus over time
to boost the agent’s incentives. While a full solution to this case is beyond the
scope of this paper, we highlight here a negative result: endogenizing the bonus
does not eliminate the inefficiency in effort. To see why, suppose by contradiction
that the agent’s effort is always at the efficient level. Then the principal does not
invest, as she receives the largest possible payoff when her attention technology
is low and she bears no investment nor bonus costs. It follows that in equilib-
rium the agent’s belief about the principal’s type must go down as time passes
without recognition,22 and inducing efficient effort requires the bonus to become
22Note that the principal cannot signal her type through the bonus offer: the low type can
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arbitrarily high over time. However, the high type is not willing to offer such a
high bonus: the gain is no larger than the present value of future efficient effort,
while the cost is proportional to the bonus as the high type has to pay the agent
if recognition occurs before her technology breaks.
5 Conclusion
This paper has studied a dynamic two-sided moral hazard problem in which a
worker chooses effort and the manager chooses whether to invest in an attention
technology to recognize worker performance. We showed that when recognition is
of good performance, the relationship falls into deterioration: absent recognition,
worker effort and eventually managerial investment decrease, and a return to high
productivity becomes less likely as time passes. These deteriorating dynamics do
not arise when recognition is of bad performance or independent of effort.
Our work highlights the role of workers’ beliefs about managerial attention.
These beliefs have important implications for the dynamics of the employment
relationship, particularly in jobs such as those based on innovation, where workers
are rewarded for good contributions rather than punished for bad outcomes.
We find that, as workers get pessimistic about the presence of a monitoring
system that can recognize their contributions, they reduce their effort, and even
if management then improves its monitoring system, it will find it difficult to
restore its reputation. More broadly, our paper contributes to the theory of
reputation by endogenizing the learning process and uncovering the effects of
different forms of endogenous learning.
Our analysis restricted attention to continuous equilibria. There also exist
discontinuous equilibria of our game, in which the worker’s belief jumps in the
absence of recognition. Discontinuous equilibria can in principle take many arbi-
trary forms. In Appendix E, we study a simple class of stationary discontinuous
equilibria: as a function of the time since recognition, the manager invests only in
countably many points, where the time in between these points is fixed and the
manager invests with the same mass probability at each of them. We show that
always mimic the high type at no cost.
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the manager prefers a continuous equilibrium, as characterized in Proposition 1,
to any discontinuous equilibrium in this class. A characterization of the whole
set of equilibria and their properties is left for future work.
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A Appendix: Proof of Proposition 1
This proof is divided into six steps. Steps 1-2 solve for the equilibrium dynam-
ics; we proceed backwards by first solving for the dynamics at s ≥ s and then
considering s < s. Step 3 proves smooth pasting. Step 4 shows existence. Steps
5-6 deal with the uniqueness results.
Step 1: Dynamics at s ≥ s. At each time s ≥ s, the principal must be
indifferent between investing and not investing. Using (4)-(6), the evolution of
Λs, Ψs, and pi
L
s at s ≥ s is given by
Λ˙s = 0, (11)
Ψ˙s = −p˙iLs , (12)
p˙iLs = −as + rpiLs , (13)
with initial conditions Λs = F , Ψs = Ψ, and pi
L
s = pi
L, where Ψ and piL are
derived subsequently. To solve, note that as shown in the text, (4)-(6) and (11)
imply that condition (7) holds for s ≥ s; that is, Ψsµas = (γ + r)F at each such
time.23 Combining these equations we obtain that the evolution of Ψs for s ≥ s
is given by24
Ψ˙s =
(γ + r)F
µΨs
+ rΨs − r(Ψ + piL). (14)
Condition (7) implies that Ψs is bounded away from zero for all s ≥ s. Hence,
the right-hand side of equation (14) is uniformly Lipshitz continuous and, by the
Picard-Lindelo¨f theorem (Hartman, 1982), the initial value problem given by (14)
and the initial condition Ψs = Ψ > 0 has a unique solution on the whole interval
[s,∞). Let Ψ∗s denote this unique solution given initial value Ψ. Then using (7)
and the fact that as = µbxs for all s ≥ 0, we can express the equilibrium belief
23To derive this equation, note that, differentiating (4) and (5), we have
Λ˙s = p˙i
H
s − p˙iLs = −as − γpiLs − µaspiH0 + (r + γ + µas)piHs + as − rpiLs .
Canceling terms, substituting F = piHs − piLs and Ψs = piH0 − piHs , and setting Λ˙s = 0 yields the
equation.
24To obtain this equation, substitute (13) into (12) and use (7) to substitute for as. To
substitute for piLs , note that by definition, pi
H
0 = Ψs + Λs + pi
L
s for any s ≥ 0; hence, given Ψ
and piL, we have piH0 = Ψ + F + pi
L, and using (6), we obtain piLs = Ψ + pi
L −Ψs for all s ≥ s.
30
and effort at s ≥ s in terms of Ψ∗s:
x∗s =
(γ + r)F
Ψ∗sµ2b
, (15)
a∗s =
(γ + r)F
Ψ∗sµ
. (16)
Furthermore, note that qs must be continuous for s > s. This follows from the
fact that, by condition (7), xs =
(γ+r)F
µ2bΨs
, which is a C∞ function of Ψs, which
is C1; hence, xs is also C
1 and in particular x˙s, and thus qs, are continuous for
s > s. Using (2), the equilibrium investment for s > s is then given by
q∗s =
x˙∗s + γx
∗
s
(1− x∗s)
+ x∗sµa
∗
s. (17)
Remark 1. As shown in Step 4 below, the equilibrium conditions imply that q∗s
given in (17) is positive for all s ≥ s.
Observe that if Ψ˙s > 0, the solution to (14) has Ψ˙
∗
s > 0 for all s > s (since the
solution is unique, no stationary point can be reached in finite time). We show
below that Ψ˙s > 0 must indeed hold. Using (15) and (16), this implies that the
agent’s belief x∗s and the agent’s effort a
∗
s are strictly decreasing for all s ≥ s.
Finally, we show that the principal’s investment q∗s is decreasing for s > s
large enough. We write the proof assuming that xs is twice differentiable and
hence qs differentiable once. However, a similar argument can be used if xs is
differentiable only once, in which case ˙˙xs must be replaced with (x˙s+δ − x˙s)/δ
and q˙s with (qs+δ − qs)/δ. Since the main point of the argument involves taking
limits on s→∞ leaving δ fixed, the result obtains for the case of xs only C1.
Differentiating (17) (and omitting the symbol ∗ below to ease the exposition),
q˙s for s > s is given by
q˙s =
˙˙xs(1− xs) + γx˙s + x˙2s + 2µ2bxs(1− xs)2x˙s
(1− xs)2
. (18)
31
Rearranging terms,
(1− xs) q˙s
x˙s
=
˙˙xs
x˙s
+
γ + x˙s + 2µ
2bxs(1− xs)2
(1− xs) . (19)
We will show that lims→∞(1 − xs) q˙sx˙s > 0. Since x˙s < 0 and 1 − xs > 0 for all
s ∈ [s,∞), this implies q˙s < 0 for s large enough. Using (14) and (15), note that
˙˙xs
x˙s
= −2Ψ˙s
Ψs
+
˙˙Ψs
Ψ˙s
= −2Ψ˙s
Ψs
− µbxs
Ψs
+ r.
As s → ∞, x˙s → 0 and Ψ˙s → 0. Thus, substituting in (19) and denoting
x ≡ lims→∞ xs and Ψ ≡ lims→∞Ψs,
lim
s→∞
(1− xs) q˙s
x˙s
= −µbx
Ψ
+ r +
γ + 2µ2bx(1− x)2
(1− x) . (20)
It follows that lims→∞(1− xs) q˙sx˙s > 0 if and only if
0 < −µbx(1− x) + rΨ(1− x) + γΨ + 2µ2bx(1− x)2Ψ
= r(Ψ− piL)(1− x) + γΨ + 2µ2bx(1− x)2Ψ, (21)
where piL ≡ lims→∞ piLs and we have used the fact that−µbx+rpiL = lims→∞ p˙iLs =
0. Observe that for all s > 0,
r(Ψs − piLs ) = r(piH0 − piHs )− rpiLs
> rµb
∫ s
0
e−rτxτdτ − µbxs
> µbxs
(
1− e−rs)− µbxs,
where we have used the fact that xτ > xs for all τ ∈ [0, s). Therefore, we obtain
lims→∞ r(Ψs− piLs ) = r(Ψ− piL) > 0, implying that the right-hand side of (21) is
strictly positive.
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Step 2: Dynamics at s < s. The agent’s belief xs for s ≤ s is pinned down
by the solution to the differential equation (3) with initial condition x0 = 1.
Since the right-hand side of (3) is Lipshitz continuous in x, it follows from the
Picard-Lindelo¨f theorem that there exists a solution and it is unique. Note that
this solution does not depend on s. Using this solution and (1), the agent’s effort
at s ≤ s is as = µbxs. Note that both xs and as are decreasing for all s < s. We
denote the values at s by xs ≡ x(s) and as ≡ a(s); when not confusing, we omit
the dependence of x and a on s. It follows from (7) that
Ψ =
(γ + r)F
µa
. (22)
Using (4)-(5), the evolution of Ψs, Λs, and pi
L
s at s ∈ [0, s] is given by
Λ˙s = (γ + r)Λs − µasΨs, (23)
Ψ˙s = −Λ˙s − p˙iLs , (24)
p˙iLs = −as + rpiLs , (25)
where the following boundary conditions must be satisfied: Λs = F by definition
of s, Ψ0 = 0 by definition, and pi
L
s = pi
L by continuity of piLs . To solve, note
that given as for s ≤ s and the boundary condition piLs = piL, there is a unique
solution to (25). Moreover, by definition, Λs = F + Ψ + pi
L − Ψs − piLs . Hence,
having the solution for piLs , we can obtain Λs and Ψs for s < s by solving
25
Ψ˙s = −(γ + r)(F + Ψ + piL −Ψs − piLs ) + µasΨs + as − rpiLs , (26)
with initial condition Ψ0 = 0. This differential equation is linear and thus has a
simple closed-form integral solution.
Step 3: Smooth pasting. We next prove smooth pasting, namely that x˙s must
be continuous at s. This implies x˙s < 0 for s <∞, and hence a˙s < 0 and Ψ˙s > 0
as claimed above. Note also that smooth pasting implies qs continuous at s (i.e.
qs = 0) and thus qs is continuous for all s ≥ 0 in the equilibrium (see Step 1).
25To obtain this equation, substitute (23), (25), and Λs = F + Ψ + pi
L −Ψs − piLs into (24).
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To prove smooth pasting, note first that lims→s− x˙s ≤ lims→s+ x˙s. This is
immediate since qs = 0 for s < s, so it follows from (1) and (2) that xs can only
jump up at s. Next, we show that lims→s− x˙s ≥ lims→s+ x˙s. Note that
Λ˙s = (γ + r)Λs − µ2bxsΨs,
so given that Λs, xs, and Ψs are continuous, Λ˙s is also continuous, with lims→s Λ˙s =
0. Moreover, since the principal cannot have incentives to invest before time s,
Λ˙s ≥ 0 for s < s, s sufficiently close to s, and hence we must have lims→s− ˙˙Λs ≤ 0.
Noting from (14) and (23)-(25) that Ψ˙s is also continuous, we can write this as
lim
s→s−
˙˙Λs = −µ2bxsΨ˙s − µ2bΨs lim
s→s−
x˙s ≤ 0,
where we have used the fact that lims→s Λ˙s = 0. Manipulating this inequality,
lim
s→s−
x˙s ≥ − xs
Ψs
Ψ˙s.
Now consider lims→s+ x˙s. Using (15), we have
lim
s→s+
x˙s = −(γ + r)F
µ2bΨ2s
Ψ˙s,
where we have used again the fact that Ψ˙s is continuous. Hence, a sufficient
condition for the claim to be true is
− xs
Ψs
Ψ˙s ≥ −(γ + r)F
µ2bΨ2s
Ψ˙s,
which is equivalent to
xs ≤ (γ + r)F
µ2bΨs
.
By (16) and as = µbxs, this inequality holds with equality. The claim follows.
Finally, note that the result that x˙s is continuous at s implies qs = 0 and thus
−γxs − x2s(1− xs)µ2b = −
(γ + r)F
µ2bΨ2s
Ψ˙s,
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where by (15) we have xs =
(γ+r)F
Ψsµ2b
. Using Ψs = pi
H
0 − piLs − F and (14) to
substitute Ψs and Ψ˙s and rearranging terms yields the following condition on
piLs :
piLs =
1
r
{
a(s)− [γ + (1− x(s))µa(s)]Ψ(s)} ≡ piL(s). (27)
Step 4: Existence. Having the values of Ψ and piL (given by (22) and (27)
respectively), we can solve for the equilibrium dynamics as explained above. As
noted in Remark 1, one can verify that the equilibrium conditions ensure that qs
given in (17) is positive for all s ≥ s. To see this, suppose by contradiction that
qs < 0 for some s ≥ s. Equation (2) implies x˙s < −γxs − x2s(1− xs)µ2b for such
s, which using (15) can be rewritten as
Ψ˙s > γΨs + (γ + r)F (1− xs) . (28)
Now substituting (16) and (27) into equation (14) yields
Ψ˙s = (as − a) + r(Ψs −Ψ) + γΨ + (1− x)(γ + r)F, (29)
and combining (28) and (29) implies
(as − a) + r(Ψs −Ψ) + γΨ + (1− x)(γ + r)F > γΨs + (1− xs) (γ + r)F.
We reach a contradiction since Ψ ≤ Ψs, (1−x) ≤ (1−xs), and (as−a) + r(Ψs−
Ψ) = (as − a) + r(piL − piLs ) ≤ 0 for any s ≥ s. Note that these inequalities are
strict for s > s finite; hence, we obtain that qs is strictly positive for any such s.
An equilibrium as we have characterized therefore exists if and only if there
exists a value s ∈ (0,∞) such that: (i) pi(s) > 0; and (ii) the solution to (26)
with initial condition Ψ0 = 0 satisfies the boundary condition Ψs = Ψ(s). Note
that since p˙iLs < 0 for all s < s, (i) implies pi
L
s > 0 for s < s; moreover, using the
solution for s ≥ s, we also obtain piLs ≥ 0 for all s > s.
We show that s ∈ (0,∞) satisfying (i) and (ii) exists if F is small enough. Con-
sider condition (i). Note from (27) that piL(s) is decreasing in s with lims→∞ piL(s) =
−∞ and lims→0 piL(s) = µbr − γ(γ+r)Frµ2b . Hence, to have piL(s) > 0 for some s, a
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necessary condition is
µb
r
− γ(γ + r)F
rµ2b
> 0 (30)
and s ∈ (0, s∗), where (given (30)) s∗ is defined by pi(s∗) = 0. Observe that for
F → 0, (30) is satisfied and s∗ → ∞. That is, as F approaches zero, piL(s) > 0
for any s ≥ 0.
Consider next condition (ii). Note that the differential equation (25) with
boundary condition piLs = pi(s) has a unique solution given by
piLs =
∫ s
s
e−r(τ−s)µbxτdτ + e−r(s−s)pi(s) (31)
for s < s. Given piLs , consider now the solution to (24). This is a linear equation
in Ψs with time dependent coefficients that can be rewritten as
Ψ˙s = f1(s, s) + f2(s)Ψs,
where f1(s, s) = µbxs−(γ+r)piH0 +γpiLs , f2(s) = µ2bxs+γ+r, and piH0 = Ψ+F+piL.
A closed-form solution given initial condition Ψ0 = 0 is
Ψs =
∫ s
0
f1(τ , s)e
∫ s
τ f2(i)didτ .
Hence, there exists s > 0 such that Ψs =
(γ+r)F
µ2bx
if and only if
∫ s
0
f1(τ , s)e
∫ s
τ f2(i)didτ =
(γ + r)F
µ2bxs
. (32)
Note that for every s > 0, (γ+r)F
µ2bxs
goes to zero as F → 0, since xs is given by
the solution to (3) with initial condition x0 = 1 and is thus independent of F .
Furthermore, as F → 0, f1(s, s) tends to a positive limit, uniformly in s ∈ (0, s).
To see this, note that, using (27), limF→0 piH0 =
µbx
r
, and thus
lim
F→0
f1(s, s) = µbxs − (γ + r)µbx
r
+ γpiLs .
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Since piLs > e
−r(s−s)piLs for s < s (see (31)),
lim
F→0
f1(s, s) > µbxs − (γ + r)µbx
r
+ γe−r(s−s)
µbxs
r
.
Simplifying this expression, we find that limF→0 f1(s, s) is positive for all s ∈
(0, s) if and only if
xs
x
− 1 ≥ γ
r
(
1− e−r(s−s)) . (33)
Both sides of this inequality are zero at s = s; hence, it suffices to show that
for s ∈ (0, s), the derivative of the left-hand side is smaller than that of the
right-hand side, i.e.
x˙s < −γxe−r(s−s). (34)
By (3) (and the fact that xs > x and 1 > e
−r(s−s) for s < s), this condition is
satisfied for all s < s.
The fact that f1(s, s) goes to a positive limit uniformly in s ∈ (0, s) when F
goes to zero (while f2(s) does not depend on F ) implies that the left-hand side
of (32) also goes to a positive value, as it is the integral of a uniformly positive
function. Therefore, we have obtained that as F → 0, the left-hand side of (32)
tends to something positive and the right-hand side to zero. Note also that as
s → 0, the left-hand side of (32) tends to zero while the right-hand side has a
positive limit. By continuity of (32) in s, we conclude that for F small enough,
there exists s that satisfies (32).
We have then shown that there exists F > 0 such that if F ≤ F , both
conditions (i) and (ii) are satisfied, and note that Assumption 2 (i.e. µb ≥ (γ +
r)F ) also holds. It is immediate that if F > F , these conditions cannot be
satisfied.
Step 5: Uniqueness of s. We show that the threshold time s ∈ (0,∞) is
unique if γ > r. Rewrite (32) as
x
∫ s
0
[
µbxτ − (γ + r)piH0 + γpiLτ
]
e
∫ s
τ (µ
2bxi+γ+r)didτ =
(γ + r)F
µ2b
. (35)
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Note that using (22) and (27), we have
−(γ + r)piH0 = −γ(Ψ + F + piL)− r(Ψ + F )− µbx+ γΨ + (1− x)(γ + r)F.
Thus, using again (22), we can rewrite (35) as
x
∫ s
0
{
µb(xτ − x) + γ(piLτ − piL)
−(γ + r)Fx− rF (γ+r)
µ2bx
}
e
∫ s
τ (µ
2bxi+γ+r)didτ =
(γ + r)F
µ2b
. (36)
Denote the left-hand side of (36) by LHS(s) and the right-hand side by RHS.
We show that if s′ is an equilibrium, then LHS(s) is strictly increasing at s =
s′. Since LHS(s) and RHS are continuous, this implies that the equilibrium
threshold time s is unique: for any set of parameters, there exists a unique point
s′ where LHS(s′) = RHS. The derivative of LHS(s) with respect to s is
∂LHS(s)
∂s
= Ψs
∂x
∂s
+x

∫ s
0
[[
−µb− (γ + r)F + rF (γ+r)
µ2bx2
]
∂x
∂s + γ
∂(piLτ −piL)
∂s
]
e
∫ s
τ (µ
2bxi+γ+r)didτ
+Ψs(µ
2bx+ γ + r)− (γ + r)Fx− rF (γ+r)
µ2bx
 .
Substituting with ∂x
∂s
= −γx−x2(1−x)µ2b, ∂(piLτ −piL)
∂s
= erτµbx+µbx(1−e−r(s−τ)),
and Ψs = Ψ, and canceling and rearranging terms yields
∂LHS(s)
∂s
= x
∫ s
0
{ [
µb+ (γ + r)F
] [
γx+ x2(1− x)µ2b]− rγ F (γ+r)
µ2bx
−rF (γ + r)(1− x) + γµbx (erτ + 1− e−r(s−τ))
}
e
∫ s
τ (µ
2bxi+γ+r)didτ.
Note that (27) and piL > 0 imply µbx > γ F (γ+r)
µ2bx
+ F (γ + r)(1 − x). Hence, a
sufficient condition for ∂LHS(s)
∂s
> 0 is
[
µb+ (γ + r)F
] [
γx+ x2(1− x)µ2b]+ γµbx (erτ + 1− e−r(s−τ)) > rµbx,
which is satisfied for r small enough, and in particular if γ ≥ r.
Step 6: Other equilibria. Consider first the claim that any continuous equilib-
rium with positive investment must be as characterized in Proposition 1. We be-
gin by showing that any continuous equilibrium with positive investment where,
at each time s ≥ 0, the principal either is indifferent or does not have incentives
to invest, must be as characterized in the proposition. Suppose by contradiction
38
that this is not the case. Then there exists an equilibrium in which the prin-
cipal is indifferent (and invests) over an interval of time [s′, s′′] and she strictly
prefers not to invest over (s′′, s′′′), where s′ ≥ 0 and s′′ is finite. Such an equi-
librium must have s′ > 0, as otherwise the principal’s indifference would require
µΨ0a0 = (γ + r)F , which cannot be satisfied since Ψ0 = 0 by definition. Note
that qs cannot go to zero continuously as s approaches s
′′: as shown in Step
1 and Step 4, for any given initial value s′ > 0, the principal’s indifference
conditions uniquely determine the evolution of qs and imply qs > 0 for finite
s. Hence, qs must jump down to zero at s
′′. It follows that x˙s and therefore
µ
(
Ψ˙sas + Ψsa˙s
)
also jump down at s′′. Now note that the principal’s indifference
requires Λs = F for s ∈ [s′, s′′], implying Λ˙s = (γ + r)Λs − µasΨs = 0 and
˙˙Λs = (γ + r)Λ˙s − µ
(
Ψ˙sas + Ψsa˙s
)
= 0 for s ∈ (s′, s′′). Therefore, we obtain
that ˙˙Λ jumps up to a strictly positive value at s′′ (note that Λ˙s is continuous),
and as a consequence Λs increases strictly above F at that time. This yields a
contradiction as the principal’s strict incentives not to invest over (s′′, s′′′) require
Λs < F for those times.
We next show that a continuous equilibrium in which the principal has strict
incentives to invest over some time interval does not exist. Suppose by contradic-
tion that it does. Let s′ ≥ 0 be the earliest time at which the principal strictly
wants to invest in this equilibrium. The agent’s belief at s′ is xs′ = 1. Note
that the agent’s belief cannot increase continuously towards xs′ = 1: this would
require that the principal use a mixed investment strategy, and therefore that
she be indifferent between investing and not, while the belief increases; however,
the principal’s indifference conditions yield a strictly decreasing agent belief (see
Step 1). Hence, if s′ > 0, the agent’s belief would jump up at s′, which cannot
occur in a continuous equilibrium. It follows that s′ = 0 and the principal has
strict incentives to invest at s ∈ [0,∆), for some ∆ > 0. This means that for
each s ∈ [0,∆), the principal (weakly) prefers to invest at s rather than at s+ δ,
for any δ ∈ (0,∆ − s). However, for s = 0 and δ arbitrarily small, this implies
µa0Ψ0 ≥ (γ + r)F , which cannot be satisfied since Ψ0 = 0 by definition. This
completes the proof that any continuous equilibrium with positive investment
must be as characterized in Proposition 1.
Finally, consider the claim that there exists F > 0 such that a continuous
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equilibrium with no investment does not exist if F ≤ F . Suppose that a continu-
ous equilibrium with no investment exists. Then the agent’s belief xs follows the
law of motion in (3), and so the agent’s effort as = µbxs is decreasing at all s.
But then it is immediate that Λs > 0 for all s <∞ and Λ˙s > 0 in a neighborhood
of 0 (cf. (23) and Ψ0 = 0). Hence, for F > 0 small enough, there exists s such
that Λs > F and µasΨs ≥ (γ+ r)F ; that is, the principal has strict incentives to
invest at s, yielding a contradiction.
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Supplementary Appendix for Online Publication
This Online Appendix contains the proof of our results for the undiscounted
limit discussed in Section 2, the proof of Proposition 2, details for the discussion
of the forward-looking agent case described in Section 4, and an analysis of
discontinuous equilibria.
B Undiscounted limit
Denote a ≡ lims→∞ as. We prove the following result:
Proposition 3. Fix any set of parameters (γ, µ, b) and consider the limit as r
goes to zero. Let F < F so that the equilibrium of Proposition 1 exists. As
F approaches F , a vanishes, so the probability of returning to high performance
goes to zero as time passes without recognition.
Proof. Consider Ψ˙s for s ≤ s, given by equation (26). In the limit as r → 0, we
have
Ψ˙s = µbxs − γ(F + Ψ−Ψs) + γµb
∫ s
s
xtdt+ µ
2bxsΨs − a, (37)
where a = rpiLs . Using (27) and substituting with (22),
a = µbx− γ
2F
µ2bx
− (1− x)γF. (38)
Substituting (22) and (38) in (37) yields
Ψ˙s = µbxs − γ
(
F +
γF
µ2bx
−Ψs
)
+ γµb
∫ s
s
xtdt+ µ
2bxsΨs −
[
µbx− γ
2F
µ2bx
− (1− x)γF
]
=
(
µ2bxs + γ
)
Ψs + µb(xs − x) + γµb
∫ s
s
xtdt− γFx.
Solving this differential equation with initial condition Ψ0 = 0 gives that for
s ≤ s,
Ψs =
∫ s
0
[
µb(xτ − x) + γµb
∫ s
τ
xtdt− γFx
]
e
∫ s
τ (µ2bxi+γ)didτ . (39)
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Following the same steps as in the proof of Proposition 1, an equilibrium is a
value of s ∈ (0,∞) such that (i) a ≥ 0 and (ii) Ψs = Ψ. For condition (i), note
that the right-hand side of (38) is increasing in x and ∂x
∂s
= −γx−x2(1−x)µ2b < 0,
so a is decreasing in s. Note also that the value of s that makes a = 0 is finite.
Hence, making the dependence of a on s explicit, a(s) ≥ 0 is equivalent to
s ≤ smax for smax defined by a(smax) = 0. Note that smax is a continuous and
differentiable function of parameters.
Using (39), condition (ii) is equivalent to
x
∫ s
0
[
µb(xτ − x) + γµb
∫ s
τ
xtdt− γFx
]
e
∫ s
τ (µ2bxi+γ)didτ =
γF
µ2b
. (40)
Denote the left-hand side of (40) by lhs(s) and the right-hand side by rhs. We
show that if s′ is an equilibrium, then lhs(s) is strictly increasing at s = s′. The
derivative of lhs(s) with respect to s is
∂lhs(s)
∂s
= Ψs
∂x
∂s
+ x
{ ∫ s
0
[−(µb+ γF )∂x
∂s
+ γµbx
]
e
∫ s
τ (µ2bxi+γ)didτ
+Ψs(µ
2bx+ γ)− γFx
}
.
Substituting with ∂x
∂s
= −γx − x2(1 − x)µ2b and Ψs = Ψ and canceling and
rearranging terms yields
∂lhs(s)
∂s
= x
{
(µb+ γF )[γx+ x2(1− x)µ2b] + γµbx}∫ s
0
e
∫ s
τ (µ2bxi+γ)didτ > 0.
Since both lhs(s) and rhs are continuous, this implies that the equilibrium
threshold time s is unique: there exists a unique point s′ where lhs(s′) = rhs.
Moreover, the fact that the derivative of lhs(s) is bounded away from zero al-
lows to apply the Implicit Function Theorem and obtain that the equilibrium is
continuous (in fact differentiable) in the parameters. Hence, given an original
equilibrium s′ with s′ < smax′, a new equilibrium with s′′ < smax′′ exists for any
local change of parameters.
We next show that increasing F reduces a. Together with the results above,
this implies that starting from any given continuous equilibrium with investment,
one can increase F until a becomes arbitrarily close to zero in equilibrium. Note
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that for a fixed s, rhs increases when F increases whereas lhs(s) decreases point-
wise. Therefore, the point s at which lhs(s) = rhs increases when F increases.
Note that x depends on F only through s, and ∂s
∂F
> 0 implies ∂x
∂F
< 0. Hence,
using (38),
∂a
∂F
=
(
µb+
γ2F
µ2bx2
+ γF
)
∂x
∂F
− γ
2
µ2bx
− (1− x)γ < 0.
Q.E.D.
C Proof of Proposition 2
The case with µ > ν is analogous to that studied in Proposition 1 and thus
omitted. Consider µ ≤ ν.
The construction of the equilibrium is simple. Given a threshold time ŝ ∈
(0,∞), the law of motion for the agent’s belief on [0, ŝ] is given by (9). The
solution to this differential equation with initial condition x0 = 1 yields the
agent’s belief xs and the agent’s effort as = (µb − νb)xs for s ∈ [0, ŝ]. Since the
right-hand side of (9) is Lipshitz continuous in x, it follows from the Picard-
Lindelo¨f theorem that there exists a solution and it is unique. Note that this
solution does not depend on ŝ, and that both xs and as are decreasing for all
s < ŝ. Denote the values at ŝ by xŝ ≡ x̂(ŝ) and aŝ ≡ â(ŝ); we omit the dependence
on ŝ in what follows.
As explained in the text, (10) implies that the agent’s effort must be constant
for all s ≥ ŝ. Therefore, given continuity of xs, the agent’s belief and effort must
be xs = x̂ and as = â for all s ≥ ŝ. Moreover, given these constant values, the
principal’s investment is also pinned down: setting x˙s = 0 in (8), we obtain that
for all s ≥ ŝ, qs must be equal to
q̂ =
γx̂
1− x̂ + x̂[µâ+ ν(1− â)].
Consider now the claim that any continuous equilibrium with positive in-
vestment must take this form. First, note that this equilibrium is the unique
continuous equilibrium with positive investment where, at each time s ≥ 0, the
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principal either is indifferent or does not have incentives to invest. This follows
from (10), which implies that in any continuous equilibrium, the agent’s effort
and the principal’s value of recognition must be constant for all times s ≥ s˜ if the
principal is indifferent between investing and not investing at s˜. Next, consider
continuous equilibria in which the principal has strict incentives to invest over
some time interval. By the same reasoning as in the proof of Proposition 1, there
exists ∆ > 0 such that the principal has strict incentives to invest at s ∈ [0,∆].
However, this requires [µa0 + ν(1− a0)]Ψ0 ≥ (γ + r)F , which cannot be satisfied
since Ψ0 = 0. Thus, a continuous equilibrium in which the principal has strict
incentives to invest does not exist, and the claim follows.
Finally, we prove the claims in fn. 18. As explained above, the solution to (9)
(with initial condition x0 = 1) uniquely determines xs, and thus as = (µb−νb)xs,
for s ≤ ŝ, independently of the value of ŝ. Moreover, note that for any given ŝ,
the values of as, pi
L
s and pi
H
s are pinned down for s ≥ ŝ—these values are as = â,
piLs =
â
r
, and piHs = pi
L
s + F—and as a result the values of pi
L
s and pi
H
s are also
pinned for s ≤ ŝ:
piLs =
∫ ŝ
s
e−r(τ−s)aτdτ + e−r(ŝ−s)
â
r
,
piHs =
∫ ŝ
s
e−(γ+r)(τ−s)−
∫ τ
s [µaz+ν(1−az)]dz
{
aτ + γpi
L
τ + [µaτ + ν(1− aτ )]piH0
}
dτ
+e−(γ+r)(ŝ−s)−
∫ ŝ
s [µaz+ν(1−az)]dz
(
â
r
+ F
)
. (41)
Using (41), it follows that for any given ŝ, Ψŝ = pi
H
0 − piHŝ is given by
Ψŝ =
∫ ŝ
0
e−(γ+r)τ−
∫ τ
0 [µaz+ν(1−az)]dz
{
(aτ − â) + γ(piLτ − piLŝ )
+[µaτ + ν(1− aτ )]Ψŝ − (γ + r)F
}
dτ .
It is immediate to verify that Ψŝ is strictly increasing in ŝ and is thus bounded
above by limŝ→∞Ψŝ, which is finite. Note that µâ + ν(1 − â) is also strictly
increasing in ŝ and is bounded above by ν. Therefore, it follows that there exists
F̂ > 0 such that a time ŝ at which (10) is satisfied (i.e., Ψŝ[µaŝ + ν(1 − aŝ)] =
(γ + r)F ) exists if and only if F ≤ F̂ , and such a time ŝ is unique. Given
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the construction and claims above, this proves that a continuous equilibrium
with positive investment exists if and only if F is small enough, and such an
equilibrium is unique.
D Details for Section 4
In this section, we describe how we solve numerically the case of a forward-looking
agent discussed in Section 4.
Agent’s problem. The agent’s expected payoff at s = 0 is
U0 =
∫ ∞
0
e−rs(1−Rs)
[
µxsas
(
b+ U0
)− 1
2
a2s
]
ds, (BC0)
where Rs ≡ 1− e−
∫ s
0 µxτaτdτ . The agent’s optimization problem is
max
as
U0 =
∫ ∞
0
e−rs(1−Rs)
[
µxsas
(
b+ U0
)− 1
2
a2s
]
ds
subject to x˙ = −γxs − xs(1− xs)µas + (1− xs)qs, (42)
R˙s = (1−Rs)µasxs, (43)
x0 = 1, R0 = 0. (BC1)
Note that given the principal’s equilibrium strategy, the agent faces a relatively
simple single-agent experimentation problem where the evolution of the under-
lying state (the principal’s type) depends only on recognition, as the principal’s
investment is only a function of the time that has passed since recognition (and
her type). The agent’s action affects both the payoff process and the learning
process, and the forward-looking agent takes this into account when choosing
effort. In particular, we solve for the agent’s optimal sequence of effort taking
into account how his belief will evolve and affect effort choices depending on the
effort he chooses. This computation ensures that no deviation (including double
deviations) is profitable for the agent.
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For multipliers λ1s, λ2s, the Hamiltonian is:
H =
∫ ∞
0
{
e−rs(1−Rs)
[
µxsas
(
b+ U0
)− 1
2
a2s
]
+ λ1sx˙s + λ2sR˙s
}
ds.
The first order conditions with respect to as, λ1s and λ2s yield
0 = e−rs(1−Rs)
[
µxs
(
b+ U0
)− as]− λ1sxs(1− xs)µ+ λ2s(1−Rs)µxs,
− ˙λ1s = e−rs(1−Rs)µas(b+ U0)− λ1s [γ + (1− 2xs)µas + qs] + λ2s(1−Rs)µas,
− ˙λ2s = −e−rs
[
µxsas(b+ U0)− 1
2
a2s
]
− λ2sµasxs.
Replacing with m1s = λ1se
rs and m2s = λ2se
rs,
0 = (1−Rs)
[
µxs(b+ U0)− as
]−m1sxs(1− xs)µ+m2(1−Rs)µxs, (44)
−m˙1s + rm1s = (1−Rs)µas(b+ U0)−m1s [γ + (1− 2xs)µas + qs] +m2s(1−Rs)µas, (45)
−m˙2s + rm2s = −
[
µxsas(b+ U0)− 1
2
a2s
]
−m2sµasxs. (46)
The transversality condition on m1s and m2s is
lim
s→∞
e−rsm1s = lim
s→∞
e−rsm2s = 0. (BC2)
Given the principal’s investment qs, the agent’s effort and belief are determined
by equations (42)-(46) and boundary conditions (BC0)-(BC2).
Equilibrium dynamics and smooth pasting. We consider an equilibrium
with threshold time s ∈ (0,∞) so that the principal does not invest at s < s
and she mixes between investing and not investing at s ≥ s. As in the case of a
myopic agent, we have that for s < s,
Λ˙s = (γ + r)Λs − µasΨs, (47)
Ψ˙s = −Λ˙s − p˙iLs , (48)
p˙iLs = −as + rpiLs , (49)
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with boundary conditions
Λs = F, Ψ0 = 0, and pi
L
s = pi
L, (BC3)
where Ψ = (γ+r)F
µas
and piL is derived below.
For s ≥ s, Λs = F , so the system is
Λ˙s = 0, (50)
Ψ˙s = −p˙iLs , (51)
p˙iLs = −as + rpiLs , (52)
with boundary conditions
Λs = F, Ψs = Ψ, and pi
L
s = pi
L. (BC4)
The value of piL is obtained from smooth pasting: we require that as and xs be
continuously differentiable at s. This gives
piL =
as − Ψ˙s
r
=
1
r
(
(r + γ)F
µΨs
+
a˙sµΨ
2
s
(γ + r)F
)
.
Solving for the equilibrium. We find values (s, U0,m10,m20) such that equa-
tions (42)-(52) and boundary conditions (BC0)-(BC4) are satisfied. Begin by
fixing a set of initial values (s, U0,m10,m20). We proceed as follows:
1. Solve the agent’s problem for s < s. Given (s, U0,m10,m20) and initial
conditions (BC1), and setting qs = 0, we can solve (42)-(46) on [0, s]. We
obtain as, xs, Rs,m1s, and m2s for s < s.
2. Solve the system characterizing equilibrium dynamics for s ≥ s. We solve
(50)-(52) given the boundary conditions (BC4). We obtain as, pi
L
s ,Ψs, and
Λs for s ≥ s.
3. Solve for the agent’s belief and the principal’s investment for s ≥ s. We
obtain the belief xs on [s,∞) by inputting the effort path as obtained in
step 2 into the agent’s problem (42)-(46). Then having solved for xs and
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as, we can solve for the investment qs on [s,∞). We obtain qs, xs, Rs,m1s,
and m2s for s ≥ s.
4. Solve the system characterizing equilibrium dynamics for s < s. We solve
(47)-(49) given boundary conditions (BC3). Note that the value of Λs is
unknown here but we can solve the system because as is pinned down at
this point. We obtain piLs ,Ψs, and Λs for s ≤ s.
5. Compare solution to initial values. Having solved for all variables, com-
pute now the resulting values for the value of recognition and the agent’s
expected payoff at time s = 0, which we can denote by Ψ˜0 and U˜0 respec-
tively, and the limits lims→∞ e−rsm1s and lims→∞ e−rsm2s. If given initial
values (s, U0,m10,m20), we obtain Ψ˜0 = 0, U˜0 = U0, lims→∞ e−rsm1s = 0,
and lims→∞ e−rsm2s = 0, then we have found an equilibrium. Otherwise
we change the initial values, searching on a grid of (s, U0,m10,m20), until
these four conditions are satisfied up to some precision target.
E Discontinuous equilibria
Consider the setting of Section 1. Our analysis in the paper restricted attention to
equilibria in which the agent’s belief as a function of the time since recognition, xs,
is continuous. In this section, we study equilibria in which this belief can jump.
Because such equilibria can in principle take many arbitrary forms, we focus on
a simple class of discontinuous equilibria that are stationary. We show that the
principal prefers the continuous equilibrium characterized in Proposition 1 to any
discontinuous equilibrium in this class.
We define a stationary discontinuous equilibrium as an equilibrium in which
the principal does not invest except in countably many points s1, s2, . . . such that,
for all n ∈ N = {1, 2, . . .}, (i) sn+1 = sn+∆ for some ∆ > 0, and (ii) the principal
invests with a mass probability κ > 0 at sn. Denote the set of times at which
the principal invests by J = {s1, s1 + ∆, s1 + 2∆, . . .}. s1, ∆, and κ are such that
for some 0 ≤ x− < x+ ≤ 1, the agent’s belief that the principal is a high type
satisfies xs− = x
− and xs+ = x+ for all s ∈ J . Let s0 ≡ min{s : xs = x+}; note
that s1 − s0 = ∆.
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Figure 4 depicts a discontinuous equilibrium. (While the scale makes it diffi-
cult to see, the values of all variables shown in the figure are strictly positive at
all s ≥ 0.) At each time s ∈ J at which the principal invests, the agent’s belief
xs jumps from x
− to x+, and so effort as jumps from a− = µbx− to a+ = µbx+.
At all other times s /∈ J , the evolution of xs is given by the law of motion
(3), the same one that describes the agent’s belief over [0, s] in the continuous
equilibrium. Note that since the principal has incentives to invest only at the
instants s ∈ J , she must be indifferent between investing and not investing at
these times.26 Also, by construction, the low type and high type’s expected pay-
offs are the same at each s ∈ J ∪ s0, and hence the principal is also indifferent
at s0. Analogous to (6) and (7), it follows that Λs = F and µa
+Ψs = (γ + r)F
at all s ∈ J ∪ s0.
It is worth noting that in any stationary discontinuous equilibrium, ∆ must be
bounded from below by a strictly positive value.27 Although the smooth pasting
condition need not be satisfied in a discontinuous equilibrium, roughly speaking
the intuition is related to that for smooth pasting in the continuous equilibrium:
if ∆ is too small, the principal’s indifference between investing and not when
she invests would imply that she has strict incentives to invest at a previous
point. Thus, as discussed in the paper, an equilibrium where the agent’s belief
is constant from (approximately) the time at which the principal starts investing
does not exist.
Comparing with the continuous equilibrium of Proposition 1, we find:28
Proposition 4. The principal’s expected payoff at s = 0, piH0 , is higher in the
continuous equilibrium of Proposition 1 than in any stationary discontinuous
equilibrium.
26If the principal had strict incentives to invest at s ∈ J , she would invest over a time interval
[s− ε, s+ ε] for some ε > 0.
27To prove this, we can show that s0 ≤ s ≤ s1, which implies that if ∆ (and thus κ) were to
go to zero, then s0 and s1 would go to s. However, in this limit, the discontinuous equilibrium
would yield a higher payoff for the principal at s = 0, piH0 , than the continuous equilibrium of
Proposition 1, contradicting Proposition 4 below. A formal proof for the claim that s0 ≤ s ≤ s1
is available from the authors upon request.
28A welfare analysis of the agent is uninteresting because the agent is myopic. A myopic
agent is indifferent between the continuous and discontinuous equilibria at time s = 0; at any
other time, he prefers the equilibrium that induces higher effort.
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Figure 4: Dynamics in the continuous equilibrium (solid lines) and the discon-
tinuous equilibrium (dashed lines). Parameters are the same as in Figure 1. Recs
is the unconditional instantaneous probability of recognition, given by µxsas. The
vertical lines indicate the times s and s0.
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Proof. Using superscripts d and c to denote variables in the discontinuous equilib-
rium and the continuous equilibrium respectively, we have xds = x
c
s and a
d
s = a
c
s at
all 0 ≤ s ≤ min{s, s1}, and xds+ = xds0 and ads+ = ads0 for all s ∈ J . As for the prin-
cipal’s incentives, as noted, indifference implies Λds = F and µa
d
s0Ψ
d
s = (γ + r)F
at each s ∈ J ∪ s0, and at any s /∈ J ∪ s0 we must have Λds < F . Finally, we will
use the fact that in the continuous equilibrium, µacsΨ
c
s ≤ (γ + r)F for all s ≤ s.
This follows from the proof of Proposition 1, where we show that the equilibrium
threshold time s is such that the left-hand side of (32) is less than the right-hand
side at all s ≤ s.
We now proceed by proving two claims.
Claim 1. If s0 > s, then piHc0 ≥ piHd0 .
Proof of Claim 1. Suppose by contradiction that s0 > s and piHd0 > pi
Hc
0 . Note
that s0 > s implies
µads0Ψ
d
s0 = (γ + r)F = µa
c
s0Ψ
c
s0
where ads0 < a
c
s0 . Therefore,
Ψds0 = pi
Hd
0 − piHds0 > piHc0 − piHcs0 = Ψcs0 . (53)
Now note that we can write
piHd0 =
∫ s0
0
e−(γ+r)τ−
∫ τ
0 µa
d
τ˜dτ˜
[
adτ + γpi
Ld
τ + µa
d
τpi
Hd
0
]
dτ + e−(γ+r)s
0−∫ s00 µadτ˜dτ˜piHds0
<
∫ s0
0
e−(γ+r)τ−
∫ τ
0 µa
c
τ˜dτ˜
[
acτ + γ
(∫ s0
τ
e−r(τ˜−τ)acτ˜dτ˜ + e
−r(s0−τ)piLds0
)
+ µacτpi
Hd
0
]
dτ
+e−(γ+r)s
0−∫ s00 µacτ˜dτ˜piHds0 ,
where the inequality follows from the fact that ads = a
c
s for s ∈ [0, s], ads < acs for
s ∈ [s, s0], and piHd0 > piHds for s ∈ (0, s0]. It then follows that
piHd0 − piHc0 <
∫ s0
0
e−(γ+r)τ−
∫ τ
0 µa
c
τ˜dτ˜
[
γe−r(s
0−τ) (piLds0 − piLcs0 )+ µacτ (piHd0 − piHc0 )] dτ
+e−(γ+r)s
0−∫ s00 µacτ˜dτ˜ (piHds0 − piHcs0 ) . (54)
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Note that piLds0 = pi
Hd
s0 − F and piLcs0 = piHcs0 − F ; hence, substituting,
piHd0 − piHc0 <
∫ s0
0
e−(γ+r)τ−
∫ τ
0 µa
c
τ˜dτ˜
[
γe−r(s
0−τ) (piHds0 − piHcs0 )+ µacτ (piHd0 − piHc0 )] dτ
+e−(γ+r)s
0−∫ s00 µacτ˜dτ˜ (piHds0 − piHcs0 ) . (55)
Recall that by the contradiction assumption, piHd0 > pi
Hc
0 . But then (55) requires
piHd0 − piHc0 < piHds0 − piHcs0 , contradicting (53).29‖
Claim 2. If s0 ≤ s, then piHc0 ≥ piHd0 .
Proof of Claim 2. Suppose by contradiction that s0 ≤ s and piHd0 > piHc0 . Note
that s0 ≤ s implies
µads0Ψ
d
s0 = (γ + r)F ≥ µacs0Ψcs0 .
Note that ads = a
c
s for s ∈ [0, s0]. Hence, we obtain
Ψds0 = pi
Hd
0 − piHds0 ≥ piHc0 − piHcs0 = Ψcs0 . (56)
Now note that given ads = a
c
s for s ∈ [0, s0], we can write
piHd0 − piHc0 =
∫ s0
0
e−(γ+r)τ−
∫ τ
0 µa
c
τ˜dτ˜
[
γ
(
piLdτ − piLcτ
)
+ µacτ
(
piHd0 − piHc0
)]
dτ
+e−(γ+r)s
0−∫ s00 µacτ˜dτ˜ (piHds0 − piHcs0 ) . (57)
29To see why (55) requires piHd0 − piHc0 < piHds0 − piHcs0 , divide both sides by piHd0 − piHc0 under
the assumption that piHd0 − piHc0 > 0:
1 <
∫ s0
0
e−(γ+r)τ−
∫ τ
0
µacτ˜dτ˜
[
γe−r(s
0−τ)
(
piHds0 − piHcs0
piHd0 − piHc0
)
+ µacτ
]
dτ+e−(γ+r)s
0−∫ s0
0
µacτ˜dτ˜
(
piHds0 − piHcs0
piHd0 − piHc0
)
.
The claim follows from the fact that
1 =
∫ s0
0
e−(γ+r)τ−
∫ τ
0
µacτ˜dτ˜ [r + γ + µacτ ] dτ + e
−(γ+r)s0−∫ s0
0
µacτ˜dτ˜ .
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For any τ ≤ s0,
piLdτ − piLcτ = e−r(s
0−τ) (piLds0 − piLcs0 ) ≤ e−r(s0−τ) (piHds0 − piHcs0 ) ,
where the last inequality follows from the fact that piLds0 = pi
Hd
s0 − F whereas
piLcs0 ≥ piHcs0 − F . Hence, substituting
(
piLdτ − piLcτ
)
in (57), we obtain
piHd0 − piHc0 ≤
∫ s0
0
e−(γ+r)τ−
∫ τ
0 µa
c
τ˜dτ˜
[
γe−r(s
0−τ) (piHds0 − piHcs0 )+ µacτ (piHd0 − piHc0 )] dτ
+e−(γ+r)s
0−∫ s00 µacτ˜dτ˜ (piHds0 − piHcs0 ) . (58)
Recall that by the contradiction assumption, piHd0 − piHc0 > 0. But then (58)
requires piHd0 − piHc0 < piHds0 − piHcs0 , contradicting (56).30‖ Q.E.D.
30This can be verified following analogous steps to those in fn. 29.
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